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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the Ancona wholesale sh market (MERITAN)
where transactions take place in three simultaneous Dutch auctions. Our
objective is to characterize the behavior of market participants and, in par-
ticular, buyers in such a market structure. Our analysis of the data shows
that buyer-seller relationships are less important than in a pairwise bargain-
ing market such as the Marseille Fish market but that a signicant amount
of \loyalty" is still present under the auction mechanism. We provide an
explanation of the \declining price paradox" for the sh market of Ancona
by linking the rule used by the buyers to set their bid to the relationship
between the variation in the price of the last transactions in the day and
the quantity of sh available on that day. In fact, the average price tends
to increase for last transactions on days characterized by limited supply of
sh.
Keywords: wholesale sh market, Dutch auction
JEL classication: D44, Q22
1. Introduction
A basic question in economics is how the behavior of market participants
is aected by the way in which the market is organized. In much of the
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microeconomic literature the market is simply considered as an anonymous
price setting mechanism which matches demand and supply. However, it
has been argued that particular forms of market organization may favor one
side of the market (for an early discussion see Vernon Smith (1964)).1 For
example, auctions should in principle extract the maximum revenue from
buyers and thus are considered to favor sellers. There is a debate as to who
is favored in other market organizations, such as posted price markets or
those in which pairwise negotiation obtains (see Myerson and Satterthwaite,
1983; Bulow and Klemperer, 1996; Lu and McAfee, 1996; Progrebna, 2006).
This paper will analyze the behavior of the participants in the Ancona sh
market, for which we have detailed data for all the transactions made over a
period of seven months.
This market is organized as three simultaneous Dutch (descending price)
auctions. We establish a number of salient facts about the behavior of the
buyers and the auctioneer and compare them, where possible, with those
revealed by the few existing studies on other sh markets.
Before doing this however, we have to answer an obvious question, why
choose a sh market? The answer is relatively simple, the particular interest
of sh markets for economists is that they exhibit two features which make
them a natural subject for economic analysis. Firstly, sh is a perishable good
and the fact that, as a result, stocks cannot be carried over makes the formal
analysis of the market simpler. Secondly the organization of such markets
varies from location to location with little obvious reason. In Iceland, for
example there are 32 auctions, 18 of these are English, i.e. rising price and
14 are Dutch, i.e. descending price. At Lorient in France, sh is sold through
a combination of pairwise trading and auction, whilst at Sete it is sold by
Dutch auction and at nearby Marseille by pairwise trading. The sh market
in Sydney is conducted as two simultaneous Dutch auctions, whilst that at
Ancona has three such auctions. The comparison of the outcomes under
dierent forms of organization is an obvious research topic but one which
has not received much attention to date. This paper will make a modest
contribution in that direction by relating the facts from the Ancona market
to those from earlier studies of sh markets.
Fish markets have a long tradition in the economic literature. The rst
1Nowadays there seems to be an increasing interest in the role of market organization
and its eect on prices, (see List, 2004), though this is still a very limited development.
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serious theoretical debate on the subject was that between John Stuart Mill
(1869) and Thornton (1870). The question at issue was the nature of the
prices charged for the same type of sh during auctions. The two points
of view were rstly that there were either several possible equilibria or no
equilibrium prices at all whilst the opposing point of view proposed that what
was observed were out of equilibrium or disequilibrium prices. This debate
was reopened by Negishi (1986) and was followed by a discussion by Ekelund
and Thommesen (1989) and a reply by Negishi (1989). What emerged as
the central issue of this debate was the interpretation of the notion of an
equilibrium price on a market such as that of sh.2
Since, as we have said, sh is essentially perishable, markets such as An-
cona can be considered as ones in which, in each period, stocks are xed
and the buyers' strategic variable are their bids. The auctioneer's strategy
involves choosing the price at which he starts the auction, and the sellers
choose the price at which they withdraw their sh from the auction. The
set of strategies depends, of course, on the sort of market organization which
is being considered. For example in markets such as Marseille the prices
proposed by the sellers and the counter oers made by the buyers are the
strategies. Whilst, as we have said, since, in markets such as Ancona, Syd-
ney or Sete the aggregate stocks available on a day are xed, the strategic
behavior of the auctioneer and of the sellers is very limited.
The overall goal of this paper is to investigate how much we can extract
from the data (section 3) concerning the behavior of the market participants
in a rather particular form of market organization. In this section we ba-
sically analyze two points, the price behavior and the buyers' and sellers'
characteristics and their relationship with each other. From this, we go on to
examine whether a certain number of the features found in other sh markets
are also present in the Ancona market,
In subsections 3.1 and 3.2 we will test for the \declining price paradox"
found by a number of authors such as Ashenfelter (1989) and McAfee and
2As a curiosity, the celebrated studies on prey-predator dynamics had in some way the
analysis of sh markets. Vito Volterra was led to study the interactions among predators
and preys by his son-in-law Umberto D'Ancona who studied the sh market in Trieste.
This is explicitly acknowledged in Volterra's 1926 seminal paper. Due to the relatively
short period covered by our data, in this paper we do not take into account biological
interactions which have an eect on the relative abundance of species and on the price of
sh as well in the long run.
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Vincent (1993) in auctions with multiple units.3 Both Marshall and Pareto
argued that this feature is present in sh prices but, for example it does not
seem to be present in the data from Marseille (see Hardle and Kirman, 1995).
In subsection 3.3 we will test for another feature of sh markets found
by Weisbuch et al. (2000), the loyalty of buyers to particular sellers. On
the Marseille sh market which they study, buyers and sellers meet face to
face and some buyers become extremely loyal to certain sellers whilst others
exhibit no loyalty at all. In our context the equivalent observation would
correspond to certain buyers always buying their sh from the same vessel
whilst others buy from all the vessels. What our data show is that even
though the catches of each vessel are put on a belt sequentially in random
order, loyalty is present and the buyers care about the identity of the sellers.
In section 3.4 the next feature that we examine is that of the participants'
performance. In other words, do some buyer or sellers do systematically
better than others in terms of the prices that they obtain? We nd that
this is the case. Section 3.5 analyzes jointly loyalty and price performances
of buyers. However, the relationship is the opposite of that found on the
Marseille Fish market, that is loyal buyers obtain better prices in the Ancona
Dutch auction.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Description of MERITAN
The MER.IT.AN (\MERcato ITtico ANcona" which is the Italian lan-
guage expression which means Fish market of Ancona) is open 4 days a week
(Tu.-Fr.; 3.30-7.30 a.m.). It consists of 3 simultaneous Dutch auctions with
about 15 transactions in total per minute. The total value of the sh sold
amounts to 25 millions ¿ per year.
All the vessels unload their sh the evening before the auction. In the
morning, each type of sh is arranged in cases of about 5-7 Kilograms. Each
morning the vessels are randomly assigned to one of three conveyor belts and
the market employees start putting the cases from that vessel on it. When
the selected seller puts a case on the belt the type of sh, the weight and the
vessel that caught the sh are shown on the screen. Then, the price display
is set (the auctioneer decides the initial price) and the price progressively
3The prediction of traditional auction theory can be found in McAfee and McMillan
(1987).
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declines as the case moves toward the end of the belt. Buyers watch the
three displays and can bid on one or more of them. In such Dutch auctions
the rst person to push the button corresponding to a belt, at the price that
has been reached for the case on that belt, wins the auction.
The data we use in the paper correspond to the sh sold on one of the
three conveyor belts. They cover the period from the 19th September 2002 to
the 28th of May 2003. The database represents 53555 transactions for a total
weight of 360115 kg. During this period 70 sellers and 149 buyers exchanged
110 transaction classes on this specic conveyor belt (data for the whole
market are more comprehensive). Note that what we call a transaction class
is dierent from a species. In fact, in this market, the items sold are recorded
using a more detailed classication than would be obtained by considering
only species. So, as an example, the species sole has three transaction classes:
big, medium and small sole, dened by the length of the sh (see the second
column of table 1 for further examples of transaction classes).
The data for all the transactions are collected daily and stored on the
market computer. For each case traded the data reports
 The day, month and time (hour and minute) of the transaction.
 The weight.
 The price per kilo and total.
 The identication number of the seller (vessel).
 The identication number of the buyer.
 The transaction class (T.C. hereafter) and its identication number.
Table 1 reports the number of transactions and the total weight for the
main TCs, buyers and sellers. We could also have used the total value traded
by each market participant but this would not change the overall picture.
To complete the description of the market we examine buyers and sellers
size distributions. We dene the size as the weight of the sh bought or sold
by the agents. As shown in gure 1, there is no dominant size among the
sellers while the buyers are clustered on the smaller sizes. The distribution
of buyers has a clear peak while that of sellers is rather at. On the other
hand it is evident that there are a few very large buyers (the solid lines are
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Figure 1: Buyers, and Sellers, size distributions. Solid line and left vertical axes: non-
parametric estimation of the density. Dashed line and right vertical axes: empirical com-
plementary cumulative distribution function.
obtained non parametrically using kernel smoothing techniques with a Gaus-
sian kernel, where h is the bandwidth; the dashed line is the complementary
empirical cumulative distribution function and its level can be read using the
right vertical axis).
3. The empirical evidence
In this subsection we take a closer look at two questions. First, we an-
alyze the way in which prices are formed and the dynamics of this process.
Second we investigate the eect of the auction mechanism. In this second
context, the two main questions are: i) does the auction destroy buyer-seller
relationships? ii) are there buyers (sellers) who obtain lower, (higher) prices
than others?
3.1. Price-quantity relationship
If we accept the ndings of auction theory we should expect that on days
when there is less sh on the market the buyers would buy at a higher price
than on those days when more sh is available and the price of the sh
would remain constant over the day. This, of course supposes that buyers
are informed as to the total quantity available which is not, in fact, the
case. Were this result to hold we should observe, over the whole period, a
7
downward sloping relationship between price and quantity. However, even
if the theory does not correctly describe the behavior of individual market
participants, it is still possible that such a price-quantity relation holds at the
aggregate level as was observed in Hardle and Kirman (1995). So, rst of all
we checked for the existence of a negative relationship at the aggregate level,
between price and quantity. For this kind of test it is not sucient to plot
the data of each transaction. Recall that the sh are sorted into cases with
more or less equal weights, this means that a plot of quantity (weight) and
price for each transaction would yield an inelastic relationship (a vertical line
in the price-quantity plane) just because the quantity cannot change freely.
To avoid this problem we use the average daily price, Pm, and the total daily
quantity, qt (these quantities relate to all the TCs).
To analyze the aggregate price-quantity relationship it is better to dier-
ence the series since the daily average price Pm (and also the daily quantity
qt, even though this is less evident; see the unit root tests below) is a non-
stationary process (because sh prices rise over time; see gure 2, left panel).
The value of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF; 4 lags are used to com-
pute the unit root test) for the daily average price Pm is equal to -1.37. The
critical values for the ADF test are -2.888 (5%), -3.491 (1%) so the unit root
hypothesis for Pm is not rejected. But it is rejected for the dierenced series
DPm (ADF test = -6.784; Critical values: -2.888 (5%), -3.492 (1%)).
For the qt series, the ADF test is -2.953. Critical values are -2.888 (5%),
-3.491 (1%). The unit root hypothesis is rejected at 5% level but not rejected
at 1%. For the dierenced series Dqt the unit root hypothesis is rejected at
both levels (ADF= -8.76; critical values are -2.888 (5%), -3.492 (1%)).
Figure 2 (right panel) shows the scatter plot of the dierenced daily av-
erage price (DPm) and the dierenced daily quantity (Dqt; units are 1000
Kg). Table 2 reports regression parameters. The aggregate slope is negative
(-0.256) and statistically signicant.
DPm Coe. Std.Error t-value t-prob
Constant 0.021 0.075 0.284 0.777
Dqt -0.256 0.064 -3.990 0.000
Table 2: Regression of DPm versus Dqt.
To ensure that the result here is not aected by such weekly seasonality
we also compute the regression using day-of-the-week dierences. In other
words, every day of the week is dierenced compared to the corresponding
8
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Figure 2: The average (taken over all the TCs) daily price series Pm (left panel). Scatter
plot of price-quantity (DPm,Dqt) relation in dierences (right panel). A unit of quantity
is 1000 Kg.
day of the previous week. The regression gives a slope of -3.68 with a t-
statistics of -5.39 that, in absolute value, is above the signicance level of 1%
.
This aggregate behavior does not always have a counterpart in the mi-
croeconomic data. Indeed plotting the date for a single buyer often yields
a rather dierent picture: price does not matter at low quantity levels. We
show this phenomenon in gure 3 (left panel) where we select the days on
which one of the largest buyers bought less than 200 Kg. of sh. In other
cases, when we examine the data for medium size buyers although we observe
a reduction in the price volatility for increasing quantities, the price has no
trend as seen in the right panel of the same gure. To have a more quantita-
tive insight we ran, for each buyer who realized more than 100 transactions
in the period under consideration, (107 buyers) a linear regression between
the daily purchased quantity (in kilograms) and the average daily price. 43
of the 107 buyers (about 40%) resulted to have a positive slope coecient.
We have furthermore selected among the 107 coecients those which are
signicantly dierent from zero at a 10% condence level. A positive sign
is observed for 21 of the 60 slope coecients passing the selection (about
35%). So the aggregate characteristic, the negative relation between price
and quantity, is not a reection of individual behavior even though this is
what standard theory would suggest.
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Figure 3: Price-quantity relationship for two buyers, each dot correspond to the obser-
vation for a day. Left panel: a large buyer at low quantities. Right panel: a medium
buyer.
Our analysis explains the downward sloping price quantity aggregate rela-
tionship using agents heterogeneity instead of the more common explanation,
based on individual demand derived from utility maximization. From the lat-
ter point of view one obtains the aggregate relationship by summing up the
corresponding individual functions, but to obtain these individual demand
curves one has to rely on a large number of assumptions (all the standard
rationality hypotheses, together with the assumption that people successfully
nd the solution of the corresponding constrained maximization problems,
etc).
However, it is possible to obtain the result using only the heterogeneity
of the agents. Think of a large number of buyers; each of whom has to buy
1 unit of a good for which they have a reservation price above which they
are unwilling to purchase. Their demand curve is vertical but with dierent
heights. So, if, for each level of price, we sum the number of goods demanded
we get a downward sloping curve. In this case one gets the same result using
very few assumptions. This idea dates back to Cournot and simply requires
that individuals have dierent reservation prices for a unit of the good in
question.
More formally in the simple case at hand (where each buyer asks for one
10
unit of the good) we can write the demand as
D(P ) =
X
i
H( Pi   P )
Where H is the Heaviside step function, Pi is buyer's i reservation price, P is
the market price and the sum runs over all the buyers. When P increases, the
number of buyers having a reservation price higher that P decreases and this
implies a downward slope for the aggregate demand function. The shape of
the aggregate demand depends on the distribution of the reservation prices.
In fact if F (P ) := Pr( Pi < P ) and N denotes the total number of buyers we
have
D(P ) = [1  F (P )]N:
3.2. Price dynamics
Our next task is to study the evolution of prices over the day. As we have
mentioned, basic auction theory suggests that on a given day the price for
each unit of a homogeneous good sold sequentially should be the same. Yet,
it is often observed that prices decline during the day, yielding the "declining
price paradox". Of the many solutions proposed perhaps that closest to our
analysis is that proposed by Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou (2007). They
argue that it is uncertainty about the total number of units available which
produces the paradox. In our case, the buyers do not know at the beginning
of the auction how much is available, but, as the auction progresses, they
become more aware of the total. This will be important for our analysis. To
analyze the price dynamics during the day we show two types of graph. We
rst rank the daily transactions by the time of day at which they occurred
and then we perform averages for the transactions with the same rank. As
shown in gure 4 the average price goes down as the rank of the transactions
increases. However, despite this general trend, a strange regularity appears:
for a large number of TCs the average price starts increasing for the last
transactions, where we will call the time of the closing transaction T .
This apparent paradox can be understood by linking the bid setting rule
followed by the buyers to the relationship between the changes in prices for
the last transactions in a day, and the total quantity of sh sold on that day.
What we will show is that the bidding rule will lead buyers to increase their
later bids on days when supply is limited. Thus, there should be a negative
relation between the changes in prices for the last transactions in a day and
the total quantity available. To see this let us examine the bidding rule.
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If a strategy such as \buy the sh at the lowest price" is optimal it must
then have a higher value than all other strategies.
For many buyers, who nd themselves faced with a transaction at time
T , it may be optimal to buy even if the price is high when they have not
reached the minimum quantity which they wish to obtain in order to satisfy
their customers demand.
On days on which buyers begin to perceive that there is a low quantity
of sh, it may thus be optimal to buy at higher than average prices starting
with a particular transaction before the last one (say at T   i) since with a
limited supply it is likely that waiting for transaction T may result in the
buyer's having diculties in buying the sh that he requires.. In other terms,
the value of strategies such as "buy the sh at the lowest price" seems to be
lower that that of other strategies and therefore cannot be optimal.
To analyze this intuition suppose that there are only two possible prices,
an high price pH and a low price pL with a dierence between the two  =
pH   pL. Furthermore, buyers need only one case of sh.
At every transaction the probability to have the sh at price pH is p. The
probability to have the sh at price pL is q < p.
At transaction T i the agent computes the expected value of the strategy
Li = \try always to buy at the lowest price from T   i to T" with utility
equal to UL(i) = ( + k)Iq(i). The random variable Iq(i) is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the agent get a case from T   i to T and k is a positive
constant that could be interpreted as a monetary value from being able to
sell the sh to nal consumers.
The expected value of this strategy is
E[UL(i)] = ( + k)E[Iq(i)]
with4
E[Iq(i)] =
iX
n=0
q(1  q)n = 1  (1  q)i+1: (1)
Agents compare strategy Li with the strategy Hi = \buy at a high price"
with expected utility equal to
4Iq(i) follows a geometric distribution since we can get the sh at the disjoint events
\get the sh at T   i", \not get the sh at T   i and get the sh at T   i+ 1", etc.
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E[UH(i)] = kE[Ip(i)]
with
E[Ip(i)] =
iX
n=0
p(1  p)n = 1  (1  p)i+1: (2)
Strategy L is better than strategy H if
( + k)E[Iq(i)] > kE[Ip(i)]
that is
E[Ip(i)]  E[Iq(i)] < 
k
E[Iq(i)]: (3)
Substituting eqs. 1 and 2 in 3 results in
(1  q)i+1   (1  p)i+1 < 
k
[1  (1  q)i+1]:
It is now simple to see that - very far from the last transaction period T
- condition 3 is likely to be satised since
lim
i!1
fE[Ip(i)]  E[Iq(i)]g = 0;
and
lim
i!1
E[Iq(i)] = 1;
Depending on  and k, condition 3 may not be satised when we are
near the last transaction (i low). Increasing i, the function E[Ip(i)] E[Iq(i)]
increases until a value i (usually not far from T ) and then decreases.
The value i can be computed assuming that i is real and evaluating the
rst order condition of E[Ip(i)]  E[Iq(i)],
(1  q)i+1 ln(1  q)  (1  p)i+1 ln(1  p) = 0:
Assuming that p is low (there are many participants in the auction), so
that the usual logarithmic approximation ln(1   p) '  p applies, the FOC
becomes
q(1  q)i+1 = p(1  p)i+1
13
with solution
i + 1 =
ln q   ln p
ln(1  p)  ln(1  q) :
In sum, since E[Ip(i)] E[Iq(i)] increases until a value near T it may be
possible that it crosses the threshold 
k
E[Iq(i)] making the strategy H better
than the L strategy5. This may be the case if k is suciently high.
In other words, Lmay not be the optimal strategy for all the transactions.
Near the end of the day it may be optimal to buy at a high price.
If the above explanation is correct we would expect a negative relationship
between the variation of prices for the last transactions and daily supplied
quantity (qt) in situations in which there is a very limited supply of sh and
so, where k is high. But, of course this depends on the agents' capacity to
anticipate towards the end, how long the auction will last. But this is not
implausible since agents are experienced and also have some idea, even if
only approximate of the size of the total catch since the sh is stocked at
the marketplace overnight. Alternatively it could be the case, that, as time
passes, buyers may revise their ideas of p and q (the probability of getting
the required sh at the price in question).
We perform regressions at dierent lags using the dierence PmT  
PmT i. The result is particularly signicant at i = 2. The limited-supply
eect on the last transactions is shown in gure 5 (left panel) where we de-
pict the scatter plot of price variation for the last two transactions, x =
PmT   PmT 2 versus the daily quantity of sh qt. The gure suggests that
there is a threshold above and below which the relationship between the
changes in the last prices and the daily quantity changes. We may locate the
threshold using a simple outlier region (see Davies and Gather, 1993)
fx : jx  qtj > z1 
2
qtg
where qt and qt are mean and standard deviation of x for observations
above qt. The variable z1 
2
is the usual value of the normal distribution
with condence level 1 . Using 1  = 0:9937 (which corresponds to four
standard deviations) and moving qt from right to left we found that the rst
observation entering the outlier region is at qt = 2:8.
5Note also that - reducing i - while E[Ip(i)] E[Iq(i)] increases, the threshold k E[Iq(i)]
decreases.
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Figure 4: Average price for each rank of transaction (the rst dot on the left, for instance,
is obtained collecting the price of the rst transaction for each day and computing the
average).
In the regression, the linear slope increases (in absolute terms) going
from -0.4403, but, in this case, it is not statistically dierent from zero the
95% condence interval being [-1.13708,0.25701], to -2.2648, a value which is
statistically dierent from zero, the 95% condence interval being [-4.22589,-
0.30377].
Another way to see the threshold eect is to use a non-parametric (kernel)
regression drawn in gure 5 (right panel). The regression shows a slope
increase (in absolute terms) for daily quantities that are below 2.3.
To summarize, in the Ancona sh market the average price tends to
increase for the last transactions on days characterized by a limited supply
of sh.
Another type of price dynamics analysis is shown in gure 6. Here we plot
the data corresponding to the day with the largest number of transactions for
two TCs (the horizontal axis records the time at which the transaction took
place, a value of 4.5 means that the transaction took place at half past 4 in
the morning). It is evident in general that the price rises at the beginning and
then settles down during the auction. This is due perhaps to the presence
of buyers who are obliged to buy very early in the morning for particular
reasons (they may have a rather long trip back to their shops or they may
have restaurants and have to be present early in order to prepare the meals
and so forth).
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Figure 5: Scatter plot of price variation for the last two transactions, PmT   PmT 2
versus daily quantity of sh qt. The left panel show a piecewise linear regression using the
threshold qt = 2:8 whereas in the right panel a non-parametric regression with Gaussian
kernel and bandwidth 0.4 is drawn.
In gure 7 we normalize the trading interval setting the starting minute
to \t = 0" and the end of trading to \t = 1". The graph shows the quantity
traded by buyers leaving the market after a given time t = t (for example,
there are 105 buyers out of a total of 149 who left the market after t = 0:48
and hence 44 who left earlier).
The pattern suggests that the decline in demand is not linear. Instead
there is an acceleration in the fall of the traded quantity at about t = 0:4.
Another question and one which is very old in the analysis of sh markets,
is the dependence of the price level on the day of the week.
In table 3 we re-compute the regression whose results are displayed in
table 2 adding 3 dummy variables for Tuesdays (d2), Wednesdays (d3),and
Thursdays (d4). The value of the coecients for these give the day eect
compared to Fridays. The table shows that the dummy variable for Tuesdays
is positive, meaning that the price is statistically higher than on Fridays.
However, it then falls on Wednesdays and Thursdays (or, to be precise, does
not rise, since d4 is not signicant) and then recovers (at least compared to
Wednesdays) on Fridays even though it does not return to the Tuesday level.
In other terms, sh is more expensive at the beginning of the week while
the \Friday eect" (for a long period families in Catholic countries were
16
Figure 6: Price dynamics in a given day.
Figure 7: Total traded quantity at each time in the market day.
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exhorted by the church to eat sh on Fridays) is not so evident (even though
the price tends to increase compared to Wednesdays).6 Lionel Robbins (1935)
made the following remark about the reformation in the U.K which replaced
Catholicism with Anglicanism, \The inuence of the Reformation made no
change in the forces of gravity. But it certainly must have changed the
demand for sh on Fridays".
DPm Coe. Std.Error t-value t-prob
Constant 0.061 0.132 0.459 0.647
Dqt -0.315 0.060 -5.300 0.000
d2 0.499 0.194 2.570 0.011
d3 -0.505 0.191 -2.650 0.009
d4 -0.134 0.191 -0.705 0.483
Table 3: Regression of DPm versus Dqt with dummy variables for the day of the week.
Tuesday (d2), Wednesday (d3), and Thursday (d4). Their value gives the day eect
compared to Friday.
3.3. Loyalty
We now turn to another very interesting question which is to ascertain
whether the auction mechanism destroys buyer-seller relationships. Indeed
Weisbuch et al. 2002 found evidence of loyalty of buyers to sellers in the
Marseille sh market, but there the market is characterized by bilateral bar-
gaining. In that case, every buyer could, in principle, collect every seller's
price and then choose his best action. However many do not do so, or at
least cease to do so as they become loyal to one seller. What is interesting
in the case of Ancona is that buyers still learn to become loyal as they do
in Marseille. Loyalty in the Ancona case is loyalty to a shing vessel with
whom, naturally, the buyers have no contact. However, they do have their
past experience with the sh brought from that vessel as a guide to the de-
sirability of buying from that seller, and this can, as in the Marseille case,
lead to reinforcement learning.
How then should we test for loyalty? A statistical test for showing the
(lack of) connection between buyers and sellers is the chi-square test of inde-
pendence made on the contingency table recording the number of exchanges
6The absence of a \Friday eect" could be a consequence of the secularization of the
Italian society together with the removal of the church's injunction.
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between each buyer and each seller. their respective distributions. Under
the null hypothesis agents match in a random way so there is no loyalty. To
avoid the size-problem, i.e. the fact that buyers and sellers trading greater
quantity are more likely to meet, we group buyers and sellers into two and
three groups respectively that are homogeneous with respect to traded quan-
tity. In other words, buyers with id-number between 1 and 140 buy the same
quantity as those between 141 and 303. Similarly, sellers are split in the two
groups 1-82 and 83-154. The contingency table of the 2-groups partition is
reported in table 4.
Buyers ! 1-82 83-154
Sellers #
1-140 12928 13675
141-303 13324 13582
Table 4: Contingency table of the 2-groups partition. Number of transactions between
buyers and sellers.
For the 3 groups case, a homogeneous partition is: sellers = [1-95, 96-
177, 178-303] ; buyers = [1-60, 61-111, 112-154]. The contingency table is
reported in table 5.
Buyers ! 1-95 96-177 178-303
Sellers #
1-60 5750 5607 5904
61-111 6104 5936 6046
112-154 6331 5611 6220
Table 5: Contingency table of the 3-groups partition. Number of transactions between
buyers and sellers.
The chi-square test statistic is 4.5752 (p-value = 0.032438) for the 2-
groups case and 20.850 (p-value = 0.000339) for the 3-groups case showing
that the hypothesis of random matching between buyers and sellers has to
be rejected in both cases at the 5% signicance level and, for the 3-groups
case, also at the 1%.
Then we calculated the Gini index for each buyer7. In gure 8 below we
7the Gini index is a measure of how concentrated a distribution is. In our case the
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Figure 8: Lorenz curves for two buyers.
show the Lorenz curve for the two extreme cases (the least concentrated in
the left panel and the most concentrated in the right one).
To have a global picture of the extent of loyalty in the market we made a
smoothed (Gaussian kernel) frequency distribution of the Gini index among
buyers. A signicant share of buyers have a Gini index around 0.4 and almost
all have their index between 0.35 and 0.55.
The buyer-seller relationship is dierent from that in the Marseille sh
market. There Weisbuch et al. (2002) nd basically two type of agents: the
loyal ones and the ones who seem to choose their seller at random. The
auction mechanism appears to eliminate the second kind of buyer since the
distribution in gure 9 is single peaked.
Next we investigate the dependence of loyalty on the buyer's size. Figure
10 shows that the amount of loyalty increases with the size of the buyers
up to a given value. Beyond this level, the concentration index decreases or
stays stable; this is probably because very large buyers are forced to rely on
multiple sources for their sh if they are to acquire enough.
3.4. Buyers and Sellers Price performance
In this section we examine the extent to which some market participants
do better, have a better \price performance", than others. Let us rst clarify
index equals 1 if the buyer buys from only one buyer and equals 0 if the buyer buys from
each of the n sellers he is a customer with a share 1=n of the total sh bought .
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Figure 9: Loyalty.
Figure 10: Relationship between buyers size
and their loyalty, each dot is a buyer.
what we mean by the expression \price performance". In what follows it
refers to the average price, so that a buyer has a good price performance if
he usually buys at a relatively low price, on the contrary, a seller has a good
price performance if he sells at a relatively high price. We undertake this
analysis to test the hypothesis of market eciency. In an ecient market, it
should not be the case that an agent can systematically obtain more favorable
prices for the same products than other agents so that nding systematically
good or bad price performances for some individual may be regarded as a
symptom of market ineciency.
The rst question here is: are price performances related to the amount
of sh transacted? 8 Figures 11 and 12 provide an answer. Basically it seems
that the amount of sh bought or sold has no inuence on price performances.
This conclusion is robust for buyers while for sellers we can observe that the
large ones never sold at an average price lower than 7 ¿, while some of the
smaller ones sold at a lower average price.
So to nd out if there are some buyers who pay higher (lower) prices than
8Of course the quality of sh is also important for our analysis. Unfortunately there
is no way to have this information from the dataset. One argument would be that those
who pay systematically lower prices simply buy sh of lower quality. However, discussion
with the market organizers and participants suggest that the variability of quality is too
low to account for the dierences that we observe.
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Figure 11: Buyers' price performances. All buyers (left), buyer with a purchased quantity
lower than 4000 Kg. (right) this is basically a zoom on the low quantity of the graph on
the left.
Figure 12: Sellers price performances.
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others or some vessels getting higher (lower) prices than others we perform
a more sophisticated exercise. The analysis proceed as follows. For each
subject (buyer or seller), we calculate the monthly average price and rank the
subject by his price (prices are taken in increasing order). For each month,
we thus associate the number one to the subject with the lowest price, two
to the one with second lowest price and so on. Because the data cover 9
months, subjects who were always present on the market have a vector of
9 numbers denoting their ranks. If subject X has the vector [12,5,..] this
means that there were eleven other people with an average price lower than
his average price in September, four people having a lower average price on
October and so on. To evaluate the performance of the subject we establish
a threshold (ten in the following exercises) and count the number of times
the rank of the subject was less than or equal to the threshold. In tables
6-9 we denote the number of successes in this procedure with s, the number
of months the agent was present on the market with p and his rank with
r. If we consider the average price for all the agent's transactions over the
whole period and all TCs, the price column indicates the average price and
quantity refers to the total quantity. So from table 6 we can see for example
that buyer 271 was present for all the nine months; in all the nine months his
monthly average price was among the ten lowest average prices. He bought
2991 Kg. of sh during the whole period at an average price slightly higher
than two Euros and this was the third lowest average price. Furthermore,
the same buyer had good results on the single TCs: for eight months (out of
nine) he bought small sole (TC 12) at an average price which was one of the
ten lowest average prices recorded for that TC; and in four months out of six
buying big hake (TC 13). According to table 6 there are several buyers who
perform better than others even for particular TCs (for example buyers 164,
271, 153, 177,169, 1). Table 7 reports buyers with poor performance (those
having a rank higher than 100). Buyers 90, 91 and 84 have particularly poor
performances. Tables 8 and 9 relate to sellers. The rst ones indicates sellers
who perform well (who sell at high prices and have a high rank). Sellers with
high price are 148, 83, 30, 138, 134 and 66, while those with low prices are
103 and 48.
In general these results conrm the presence of agents who systematically
perform better than others indicating that the market may, to some extent,
be inecient. An argument often used to explain dierences in the prices
obtained by the participants in certain markets is that their creditworthiness
may vary. However, on the Ancona market all transactions are paid for
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all TCs TC 12 TC 13
ID s p r price quantity ID s p ID s p
164 9 9 7 3.0778 430 271 8 9 169 6 7
271 9 9 3 2.178703 2991.52 164 6 8 271 4 6
170 8 9 4 2.769652 1231.99 165 4 7 187 3 6
176 7 9 17 3.725731 2054.42 105 3 9 155 3 6
258 7 9 11 3.350421 581.84 221 3 7 237 3 6
153 7 8 10 3.309 140.92 241 3 5 281 2 7
177 6 9 12 3.522101 7129.71 177 3 9 153 2 5
259 6 9 26 4.163261 317.77 101 3 7 138 2 7
169 6 9 16 3.678469 1449.74 178 3 6 1 2 7
1 5 8 13 3.579412 19177.11 278 2 5 130 2 7
Table 6: Buyers with good price performances.
all TCs TC 12 TC 13
ID s p r price quantity ID s p ID s p
75 9 9 148 22.65029 3599.64 269 6 7 201 7 9
84 9 9 130 10.96837 1125.12 91 6 6 84 6 9
270 9 9 144 18.58776 1261.83 90 5 6 267 6 7
106 9 9 145 18.71657 427.93 263 5 6 90 6 8
188 8 9 141 17.10356 2235.15 199 4 7 279 5 9
195 8 9 137 13.97355 1818.57 273 4 6 186 5 9
82 7 9 139 16.18111 1634.21 162 4 7 91 5 7
148 7 9 132 12.09021 947.61 117 4 7 121 5 8
156 7 9 140 16.46758 788.25 217 4 7 87 5 8
281 7 8 138 14.8035 3638.49 267 4 7 272 4 6
Table 7: Buyers with bad price performances.
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all TCs TC 12 TC 13
ID s p r price quantity ID s p ID s p
138 6 9 66 8.802716 6741.73 148 3 8 30 6 7
83 4 9 48 7.745368 7559.3 81 3 5 123 6 6
148 4 9 60 8.315651 11615.91 139 3 6 66 5 9
121 4 8 58 8.230408 2130.33 83 3 8 67 5 9
30 4 7 61 8.349025 7239.03 134 3 7 145 6 7
126 4 9 55 8.056547 3779.51 100 3 5 22 4 7
146 3 7 65 8.499142 5170.71 38 2 7 138 4 7
45 3 7 51 7.910356 3315.49 122 1 7 118 4 8
134 3 9 69 9.051084 10780.86 113 1 7 37 4 9
66 3 9 63 8.394254 3173.71 129 1 7 105 4 7
Table 8: Sellers with good price performances.
all TCs TC 12 TC 13
ID s p r price quantity ID s p ID s p
82 6 7 2 4.8025 2068.47 95 8 8 52 6 6
103 6 7 3 4.880414 3952.92 143 8 9 69 6 6
145 6 9 8 5.567217 5204.89 44 7 8 44 5 7
110 6 7 5 5.066325 4492.81 78 6 8 136 5 5
67 5 9 14 6.361449 6332.92 136 6 8 58 5 5
139 5 8 25 6.996613 4232.68 113 6 7 143 5 7
56 4 5 7 5.562541 872 48 5 5 83 4 5
113 4 9 10 5.832403 1489.01 58 5 8 129 4 8
130 3 9 11 5.83739 4837.3 134 3 7 148 3 5
48 3 5 1 4.14284 681.45 122 3 7 96 3 9
Table 9: Sellers with bad price performances.
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through a clearing mechanism at the end of each day so there is no credit.
3.5. Loyalty and price performances
We analyze in this section the relationship between buyers price perfor-
mances and loyalty by collecting the number of matches n(i;j) between buyer
i and seller j (as a measure of loyalty) and the average unitary price p(i;j) of
the case.
To avoid biases in the estimation due to the clear heterogeneity in the
panel, we estimate the two following xed eect equations
p(i;j)   i = 1 + 1n(i;j) + "(i;j) (4)
and
p(i;j)   j = 2 + 2n(i;j) + (i;j): (5)
The parameter i = n
 1
i
P
j p(i;j) varies across buyers (ni is the number
of matches made by buyer i). It captures the heterogeneity in buyer's price
(e.g., dierences in reservation prices), whereas j = n
 1
j
P
i p(i;j) diers
across sellers (nj is the number of matches made by seller j). It captures the
heterogeneity in seller's price (e.g., dierences in the quality of sh sold).
The estimates are reported in table 10.
estim. eq. 4 st.dev eq. 4 estim. eq. 5 st.dev 5
 0.2054 0.1198 0.8606 0.2149
 -0.0089 (*) 0.0041 -0.0371 (**) 0.0073
Table 10: Estimates of equations 4 and 5. The asterisk (*) means \stat. sign. at 5%"
whereas the (**) means \stat. sign. at 1%".
Estimates of equations 4 and 5 show - albeit with dierent levels of con-
dence - that loyalty results in an average reduction of the unitary price payed.
This result is in contrast to that observed in the pairwise trading situation
where loyal customers pay more. A possible explanation is that in markets
organized as Dutch auctions there is no direct relation between buyers and
sellers thus the sort of co-evolution in which buyers and sellers learn their
mutual needs and which is observed on the Marseille market cannot occur.
The reward for loyalty is probably due to the complex learning process that
emerges from transactions, but this is not the same as when buyers and sell-
ers meet face to face. For example, in the pairwise situation customers could
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be willing to pay something more to get preferential service (for example to
get priority from the seller when there is a low supply), but this cannot hap-
pen in the auction market. In an agent based model developed in Kirman
and Vriend (2001) the authors found that loyal buyers paid more but they
had fewer visits to sellers where their demand was not satised.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated a certain number of questions concern-
ing the functioning of the sh market in Ancona (MERITAN). As we pointed
out, in the introductory section, sh markets have long been studied because
they present a large range of allocation mechanisms (pairwise interactions,
English auctions, Dutch auctions, etc.) and because of the perishable nature
of the good exchanged.
At the MERITAN, transactions take place by means of three simultaneous
Dutch auctions.
The main question is to what extent the fact that the market is organized
through Dutch auctions, aects buyers' behavior. Does it diminish the abil-
ity of a buyer to perform well in terms of the prices of the transactions he
makes? How do customer seller relationships change with respect to other
types of market organization under this price setting mechanism? Evidence
from the data show that buyer-seller relationships are less strong than in a
pairwise bargaining market such as the Marseille Fish market but a remark-
able amount of loyalty is still present even under the auction mechanism.
Furthermore, loyalty seems to be negatively related to unitary price paid in
contrast to what was observed on the Marseille sh market. This result may
seem quite obvious in a normal trading situation. However, in this kind of
auction there is no direct relation between buyers and sellers. The fact that
some buyers may learn to pay lower prices may be the result of the rather
complicated reinforcement learning process that takes place over time.
We also explain the \declining price paradox" for the Ancona sh market
by linking the bid setting rule used by the buyers to the relationship between
the changes in the prices of the last transactions of the day and the total
quantity of sh sold on that day. In particular we observed that the average
price tends to increase for the last transactions on days on which there was
a limited supply of sh.
This work is a modest contribution to the literature concerning agents'
behavior in markets. We intend to pursue our investigation of this topic in
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the future by gathering other detailed datasets and by systematically inte-
grating them with our existing ones to build a more complete picture of the
relationship between the behavior of market participants and types of market
organization.
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